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THE RISE AND FALL OF CALIFORNIA'S NOTICE OF
ALIBI RULE: PROCEDURAL INNOVATION
YIELDS TO JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
I. INTRODUCTION
The defense of alibi' in criminal prosecutions has long been a source
of vexation and annoyance to the state.' Unlike other affirmative
defenses, alibi is a positive assertion by the accused that directly denies
any involvement in the criminal act. Employed in the latter stages of
the defendant's case-in-chief, after the prosecution has rested, it can
provide an element of surprise and create sufficient uncertainty among
the jurors to produce an acquittal. If not promptly and effectively
impeached, the last minute alibi defense can create the requisite degree
of doubt in the collective mind of the jury to prevent the prosecution
from establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
3
To prevent the defense from injecting a surprise alibi defense into the
latter stages of a criminal proceeding, a number of states have adopted
statutes requiring the defendant to disclose before trial his intent to
assert an alibi defense.4 The prosecution is thus alerted and prepared to
meet the defense on its merits.
Until the recent holding of Reynolds v. Superior Court,5 California
had employed a notice of alibi procedure that was completely the
product 'of judicial decision-making. The alibi procedure had devel-
oped almost unnoticed as part of a larger system of court-supervised
1. Alibi is defined as follows: "The plea of having been at the time of the commission
of an act elsewhere than at the place of the commission." WEnSTER'S THIRD NEw
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED (3d ed. 1964). "A
rebuttal of evidence of the prosecution that the accused was elsewhere than at the alleged
scene of the offense at the time of the offense." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed.
1969). "It means that at the time of commission of the crime charged in the indictment,
defendant was at a different place so remote or distant or under such circumstances that
he could not have committed offense." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1954).
2. See, e.g., Millar, Modernization of Criminal Procedure, 11 J. CluM. L.C. & P.S.
344, 350 (1920) [hereinafter cited as Millar].
3. The United States Supreme Court has established that due process requires convic-
tion in any criminal proceeding be permitted only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
4. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 777.18 (1958); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1341 (1954);
MICE. STAT. ANN. § 28-1043 (1972); Oo R v. CODE ANN. § 2945.58 (1954); S.D.
Coap. LAws § 23-75-5 (Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE CRIM. PROC. § 77-22-18 (Supp.
1975); VT. R. CRiM. P. 12.1 (1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 955.07 (1958).
5. 12 Cal. 3d 834, 528 P.2d 45, 117 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1974).
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criminal discovery.0 This system was the product of judicial enthusiasm
for the civil discovery mechanisms which were implemented in part to
remove the element of gamesmanship from the trial process and facili-
tate the truth-finding function of the adversarial system.7 The Reynolds
decision announced a judicial retreat from court-made notice of alibi
rules, declaring that henceforth, in the absence of statute, the courts
were without power to issue such orders." In part, the decision to
abandon the court-made rules was a result of tension between the notice
procedure and the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. 9 It
reflected a judicial desire to retreat from promulgating a procedural rule
that was arguably of social utility but constitutionally suspect.' 0
In Reynolds, the court abdicated the judicial power to promulgate
notice of alibi rules leaving the possibility of subsequent notice of alibi
procedures to the legislature. The problem facing California legislators
after Reynolds may be defined by tracing the origin and development of
California's unique judicial notice procedure, by comparing it with
analogous procedures in other states, by analyzing its constitutional
limitations, and by reviewing past legislative efforts to enact notice of
alibi statutes in California.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF NOTICE OF
ALIBI PROCEDURE
In several respects, alibi is unique among affirmative defenses. It
directly refutes the prosecution's case by removing the defendant from
the scene of the crime," thus forcing the prosecution to concentrate
upon affirmatively establishing, by evidence that is often circumstantial,
that the defendant was present at the time and place of the crime. The
alibi defense, unlike other defenses such as former jeopardy, insanity,
or diminished capacity, can be easily fabricated by defendants fearful of
6. See, e.g., Prudhomne v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 320, 466 P.2d 673, 85 Cal. Rptr.
129 (1970); People v. Pike, 71 Cal. 2d 595, 455 P.2d 776, 78 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1969);
People v. Lopez, 60 Cal. 2d 223, 384 P.2d 16, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1963); Jones v.
Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
7. See, e.g., Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 364 P.2d 266, 15
Cal. Rptr. 90 (1961).
8. Reynolds v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 834, 837, 528 P.2d 45, 46, 117 Cal. Rptr.
437, 438 (1974). See note 95 infra and accompanying text.
9. See note 97 infra and accompanying text.
10. See note 97 infra and accompanying text.
11. By comparison, the other affirmative defenses such as insanity, self-defense,
former jeopardy, diminished capacity, or former pardon admit the perpetration of the
criminal act but deny culpability. While a notice procedure could be created for each
affirmative defense, the need for notice in the case of non-alibi affirmative defenses is
far less urgent. See Millar, supra note 2, at 351.
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conviction. While statistical studies on the frequency and effectiveness
of manufactured alibi defenses are perforce nonexistent, criminologists
and prosecutors have long viewed the alibi defense with considerable
suspicion, particularly when asserted without warning and late in the
actual trial. 2
The concept of requiring the defendant to give pretrial notice of his
intent to assert an alibi was developed to control the potential for
exploitation of the alibi defense.13  Pretrial disclosure of intent to raise
the defense affords the prosecution ample time to investigate the factual
basis of the defense and to locate witnesses and evidence sufficient to
rebut the manufactured alibi. In the United States, the notice proce-
dure was hailed as a salutory innovation 4 and adopted by statute or
court rule in fourteen states between 1927 and 1942.1r While the
notice procedures varied in their specific requirements, each was basical-
ly designed to counter the surprise impact of an unannounced alibi
defense and to discourage sham alibis. 6
The statutory notice of alibi procedures adopted in the United States
require the accused to make disclosure of his alibi defense at various
times before trial. 7  Notice is given either automatically 8 or upon
12. See, e.g., id. at 350:
That the manufactured alibi is one of the main avenues for escape of the guilty
needs no demonstration. Moreover, the amount of perjury that is annually commit-
ted in this connection forms a most considerable item in the mass of unpunished
crimes.
13. The concept of requiring pretrial notice of the affirmative defenses apparently
originated in Scotland, which singled out the defenses of alibi, insanity at the time of the
act, self-defense, commission of the act by another, and "sleep or temporary mental
disassociation or hysterical amnesia" for the notice requirement. Wilson, A Study
Relating to Notice of Alibi in Criminal Actions, 3 CAL. L. REvISION COMM'N, REPORTS,
RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIES J-9 to J-10 (Oct. 1960) [hereinafter cited as LAw REvIsloN
COMM'N].
14. Earl Warren, then serving as District Attorney of Alameda County, endorsed an
early and unsuccessful notice of alibi measure:
I am heartily in favor of the provision of the law which requires the defendant to
give five days notice of his intention to rely upon the defense of alibi . . . . [I]
can see no reason why a defendant who was not present at the time of the commis-
sion of the alleged offense should hide the fact from the prosecuting officers or the
court.
LAw REvISION COMM'N, supra note 13, at J-20. See also Millar, The Statutory Notice of
Alibi, 24 J. Cnim. L.C. & P.S. 849 (1933).
15. See Epstein, Advance Notice of Alibi, 55 J. CEiM. L.C. & P.S. 29, 30 (1964).
16. See, e.g., Esch, Ohio's New Alibi Defense Law, 9 PANEL 52, (Sept.-Oct. 1931);
Millar, supra note 2, at 350-51.
17. See, e.g., IowA CoDE ANtN. § 777.18 (1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1341 (1964);
MicH. CoMp. LAWS § 768.20 (1948); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.58 (1950).
18. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 777.18 (1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1341 (1964);
MIcH. CoMp. LAws § 768.20 (1956); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.58 (1954).
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written demand filed by the prosecution. 19 The required notice is
served in writing, and depending upon the jurisdiction, sets forth the
accused's precise location at the date and time of the offense,20 the
names and addresses of all alibi witnesses he intends to call to support
the defense,21 and the intended testimony of each such witness. If the
accused fails to disclose either the intent to assert an alibi or the name of
a particular alibi witness, in most jurisdictions he may be barred from
presenting the defense or the testimony of the particular witness. 22
California's own notice of alibi procedure, as it existed before Rey-
nolds, did not develop from a particular prosecutorial distrust of alibi
defenses. Instead, it emerged, as previously indicated, from a period of
judicial infatuation with and expanded reliance upon discovery mecha-
nisms in criminal as well as civil litigation. 23  The California Supreme
Court implemented limited discovery rights for the accused, recognizing
that such rights, although not constitutionally mandated, 4 promoted
the expeditious and orderly ascertainment of truth. Having created
discovery rights for the accused,25 the prosecution was likewise granted
limited discovery against the defendant. The uniqueness of California's
notice of alibi procedure, aside from its purely judicial origin, lies in its
rationale. Other states considered notice of alibi as a shield to protect
the prosecution against surprise and fabricated alibi defenses. Califor-
nia, however, recognized the device as a sword, albeit a very specialized
19. See, e.g., MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 630.14 (1947).
20. See, e.g., OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.58 (1954).
21. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 777.18 (1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1341 (1964);
MICH. CoMP. LAws § 768.20 (1956); N.Y. CRIM. Pnoc. § 250.20 (McKinney Supp.
1974).
22. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRnM. P. § 3.220 (1974); IowA CODE ANN. § 777.18 (1950);
MICH. STAT. Am. § 28.1044 (1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 630.14 (1947); N.Y. CGum.
PRoc. § 250.20 (McKinney Supp. 1974); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.58 (1954); S.D.
Comp. LAws § 23-37-5 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-22-18 (1953). California courts
appeared to follow the majority rule as illustrated by the appellate record. See, e.g.,
Reynolds v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 834, 837-39, 528 P.2d 48-51, 117 Cal. Rptr.
437, 440-44 (1974).
23. For an analysis of California's civil discovery mechanisms and the philosophy
behind civil discovery see Justice Peters' majority opinion in Greyhound Corp. v.
Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 364 P.2d 266, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1961).
24. See, e.g., People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 585, 305 P.2d 1, 13 (1956).
25. See, e.g., People v. Estrada, 54 Cal. 2d 713, 716, 355 P.2d 641, 642, 7 Cal. Rptr.
897, 898-99 (1960); People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. 2d 755, 768-71, 349 P.2d 964, 972-74, 3
Cal. Rptr. 148, 156-57 (1960); Cash v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 72, 74-76, 346 P.2d
407, (1959); Funk v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 423, 424-25, 340 P.2d 593, 594 (1959);
Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 812, 819, 330 P.2d 39, 43 (1958); Powell v.
Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 704, 706-09, 312 P.2d 698, 699-701 (1957); People v. Riser,
47 Cal. 2d 566, 585-88, 305 P.2d 1, 13 (1956).
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one, for probing the defendant's case. Because of this conceptual
distinction, constitutional tensions that went virtually unperceived in
other jurisdictions 28 were created in the California procedure.
A. Jones v. Superior Court: The Opening Phase of
Prosecutorial Discovery
The broad question of whether the prosecution was entitled to con-
duct discovery was answered in Jones v. Superior Court,27 a case that
had nothing whatever to do with alibi defenses or procedures, but
nonetheless became the cornerstone upon which California's judicial
notice of alibi rules were constructed. It is essential to review the facts
and reasoning behind the Jones decision in order to understand the
subsequent development and eventual decline of California's judicial
notice of alibi procedure.
Jones involved a defendant charged with rape. On the date set for
trial, counsel moved for a continuance in order to gather further medical
evidence to support a defense of impotency. The trial court granted the
continuance, whereupon the prosecution moved for and obtained a
discovery order requiring the defendant to provide the district attorney
with the names and addresses of all doctors who treated the defendant
before trial and all medical reports and x-rays pertaining to the ac-
cused's medical condition. The defendant challenged the discovery
order by a writ of prohibition on the grounds that it violated his con-
stitutional privilege against self-incrimination as well as the attorney-
client privilege.25 In reviewing the *order, the supreme court for the
26. See, e.g., State v. Thayer, 176 N.E. 656 (Ohio 1931). The court affirmed Ohio's
notice of alibi statute, among the first enacted in the United States, declaring that the
procedure
gives the state some protection against false and fraudulent claims of alibi often pre-
sented by the accused so near the close of the trial as to make it quite impossible
for the state to ascertain any facts as to the credibility of the witnesses called by
the accused.
Id. at 657.
27. 58 Cal. 2d 56, 327 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962). In language recalling
People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 305 P.2d 1 (1956), Justice Traynor in Jones concluded
that, absent a valid claim of privilege, the accused had "no valid interest in denying the
prosecution access to evidence that can throw light on issues in the case." 58 Cal. 2d
at 59, 372 P.2d at 921, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
28. Although the court went on to uphold the basic right of the prosecution to conduct
a limited form of discovery, it did grant petitioner's writ insofar as the trial court sought
medical reports of all doctors who treated the defendant before trial. Some of these
reports, reasoned the majority, were privileged from discovery under the attorney-client
privilege. 58 Cal. 2d at 60-61, 372 P.2d at 921-22, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 881-82, citing, inter
alia, San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. 2d 451, 455, 359 P.2d
925, 928, 11 Cal. Rptr. 373, 376 (1961).
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first time acknowledged a right to limited prosecutorial discovery,
which later would be judicially extended to notice of alibi orders and
sanctions.20
The Jones court rejected the defendant's argument that any court
order compelling him to supply information to the prosecution violated
his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.30 Justice Traynor
reasoned that the order merely required the petitioner to presently
disclose information the existence of which he had openly announced in
seeking a continuance. 3' Justice Traynor further analogized the order
to disclosures of the type required under notice of alibi statutes existing
in other jurisdictions which had been upheld against similar self-incrimi-
nation challenges.32  The trial court's order was, like the notice of alibi
statutes, simply a procedural pleading requirement for a limited form of
pretrial disclosure where the intent to disclose at trial had been openly
announced.33
The Jones majority, having disposed of the constitutional issue raised
by the defendant, went on to explain the basis for the trial court's
authority to fashion discovery orders compelling disclosures by the
accused.34 The judiciary, reasoned Justice Traynor, had the inherent
29. 58 Cal. 2d at 61-62, 372 P.2d at 922, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
30. Jones was decided before the United States Supreme Court ruled that the privilege
against self-incrimination of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution was
applicable to the states. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). The petitioner in Jones
relied upon the analogous state statutory and constitutional privileges: "In criminal pros-
ecutions, in any court whatever, ... [n]o person shall ...be compelled, in any crim-
inal case, to be a witness against himself." CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 13 (West 1954). See
also CAL. Evm. CODE § 940 (West 1966) (formerly CAL. PEN. CODE § 1323).
31. Insofar as the trial court's order herein requires petitioner to reveal the names
and addresses of witnesses he intends to introduce in evidence to support his defense
of impotence, it does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination. . . . It
simply requires petitioner to disclose information that he will shortly reveal anyway.
58 Cal. 2d at 62, 372 P.2d at 922, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
32. Justice Traynor's opinion noted N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 295-I (McKinney
1936) (later declared unconstitutional in People v. Busch, 308 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y.
1973)); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.58 (1954) (upheld in State v. Thayer, 176 N.E.
656 (Ohio 1931)), and Wis. STAT. ANN. § 955.07 (1958) (upheld in State v. Kopacka,
51 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1952)). 58 Cal. 2d at 61, 372 P.2d at 882, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 922.
33. 58 Cal. 2d at 61, 372 P.2d at 922, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 882. The "intent to disclose at
trial" rationale frequently was used to justify prosecutorial discovery procedures in the
face of a self-incrimination challenge. Not all scholars, however, agreed that notice
would be required for all affirmative defenses or should include the names and addresses
of those witnesses the defendant intended to call at trial. See, e.g., Millar, supra note 2,
at 351 (suggesting notice should be limited to the defenses of insanity, self defense, and
alibi); Millar, The Statutory Notice of Alibi, 24 J. CalM. L.C. & P.S. 849, 859 (1933)
(reasoning that requirement of pretrial notice of defense is sufficient without specifica-
tion of names of alibi witnesses).
34. 58 Cal. 2d at 59-60, 372 P.2d at 921, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
1976]
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power to promulgate rules for the orderly ascertainment of truth.85 The
present order, since it was limited to information which the defendant
intended to disclose at trial, was within the purview of such rules. The
court noted the absence of a statutory criminal discovery procedure80
and recalled its own earlier decisions which had created limited discov-
ery rights for the accused. 7 Those earlier decisions were not based
upon constitutional considerations, but rather upon a recognition that,
absent some constitutional or statutory privilege, the prosecution had no
reason to deny the accused access to information which could assist in
the orderly ascertainment of truth.8 8 Having determined that no consti-
tutional protections barred the trial court's order, the Jones court con-
cluded that criminal discovery was not a "one way street" available
solely to the accused.8 9
Two of the seven justices rejected Traynor's disposition 'of the self-
incrimination issue raised in Jones.4" Justice Peters, while concurring
in the result, expressly rejected the majority's two-way street argument4'
35. Although not cited in the opinion itself, the court was undoubtedly aware of the
California Law Revision Commission's report which recommended adoption of a
statutory notice of alibi procedure. See LAw REvisION COMM'N, supra note 13. The
court's only allusion to the recent legislative concern over notice of alibi proposals in the
state legislature was a brief passage confirming that in the case of criminal discovery for
the prosecution it was "appropriate . . . for the courts to develop rules governing
discovery in the absence of express legislation authorizing such discovery." 58 Cal. 2d
at 59, 372 P.2d at 920-21, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 880-81. Some twelve years later the court
was less certain as to the appropriateness of its rule-making powers. Reynolds v.
Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 834, 837, 528 P.2d 45, 46, 117 Cal. Rptr. 437, 438 (1974)
(noting that complex issues of federal and state constitutional rights counsel against
judicial rule-making in this area).
36. 58 Cal. 2d at 59, 372 P.2d at 922, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
37. Id. at 58, 372 P.2d at 920, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
38. Id. at 59, 372 P.2d at 921, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 881. See also People v. Riser, 47 Cal.
2d 566, 586, 305 P.2d 1, 13 (1956).
39. 58 Cal. 2d at 60, 372 P.2d at 921, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 881. The "one-way
street" language of the majority became a commonly employed metaphor for describing
the need to keep discovery a two-sided process. See, e.g., Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S.
470, 475 (1973) ("discovery must be a two-way street").
40. Justice Peters viewed the privilege against self-incrimination as "fundamental,
unlimited, and absolute." 58 Cal. 2d at 63, 372 P.2d at 923, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 883
(concurring opinion).
41. "The simple fact is that our system of criminal procedure is founded upon the
principle that the ascertainment of facts is a 'one-way street.'" Id. at 64, 372
P.2d at 924, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 84. The basic difference between Justice Peters' position
and that of the majority can best be understood by separating the privilege into its two
constituent parts, that of any person not to answer questions that tend to incriminate and
the privilege of a defendant to avoid all questions by refusing to take the stand. Compare
CAL. EvID. CODE § 930 (West 1966), with id. § 940. Justice Peters, unlike the majority,
included in the privilege the traditional view that a defendant may remain silent because
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and the analogy between the trial court's order and notice of alibi
procedures existing in other states.42 Instead, he preferred to await the
legislature's enactment of a comprehensive criminal discovery system."
Justice Dooling's dissent accurately foresaw that Jones had opened the
door for the prosecution to make unlimited inquiry into any defense the
accused would present at trial.44
Jones established a prosecutorial right to discover information the
defendant intended to disclose at trial." The trial court's authority to
order such discovery stemmed from the inherent power of the courts to
promulgate rules governing procedural and pleading matters. Jones,
however, did not specifically set forth guidelines on the nature and scope
of future discovery orders to be fashioned by trial courts, nor did it
explain whether the prosecution would be permitted to compel the
defendant to disclose the intent to rely upon specific affirmative de-
fenses. The dissent, and perhaps even the majority, clearly felt that the
decision impliedly approved orders that would compel the defendant to
state all affirmative defenses in advance of trial.4" Although Jones on
its facts presented a situation where the defendant himself made a
no compulsion to disclose information arises until the prosecution has presented a prima
facie case against him. See generally United States v. Housing Foundation, 176 F.2d
665, 666 (3d Cir. 1949) (cited by Justice Peters).
42. Those statutes, Peters argued, were unsupported by federal rulings on their
constitutional validity (58 Cal. 2d at 67, 372 P.2d at 926, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 886) and in
addition, the existence of a statutory scheme requiring notice of alibi in some jurisdic-
tions was scarcely a basis for implementing in California a "similar rule as to affirmative
defenses generally." Id. Cf. United States v. Mulinsky, 19 F.R.D. 426 (S.D.N.Y.
1956) (holding that criminal discovery under federal rules was not analogous to civil
discovery).
43. Justice Peters thus agreed with the lower appellate court's ruling on the alibi order.
That court had held:
"L"]he legislature has not elected to tackle the ticklish problems of discovery in
criminal cases directed against the defendants and within that inconsiderable area
bounded by the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. I do not find
any inherent judicial power to preempt this excursion into procedural reform."
58 Cal. 2d at 68, 372 P.2d at 926, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 886, quoting Jones v. Superior Court,
17 Cal. Rptr. 575, 578 (1962) (concurring opinion) (vacated).
44. 58 Cal. 2d at 68-69, 372 P.2d at 926, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 886. Justice Dooling's
dissent anticipated the far-reaching consequences of Jones when it posed the question:
[A]re we opening the door, as Justice Peters suggests, to a general inquiry by the
prosecution whether the defendant intends to rely on any affirmative defense and
if so what the nature of such affirmative defense may be?
Id. at 69, 372 P.2d at 927, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 887.
45. The rationale used by the Jones court concerning the intent to disclose at trial
was previously employed in other jurisdictions to support notice of alibi procedures. See,
e.g., People v. Rakiec, 23 N.Y.S.2d 607, 612 (App. Div. 1940); Simos v. Burke, 163
N.W.2d 177, 181 (Wis. 1968).
46. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
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voluntary pretrial disclosure of his intent,47 it was to become apparent
that the case supported trial court orders that compelled the accused to
disclose his intent. Notice of alibi orders were to emerge among the
procedures impliedly sanctioned by the Jones decision.
B. Judicial Creation of Notice of Alibi Procedure
In People v. Lopez,4 the California Supreme Court confronted the
issue of prosecutorial discovery in the specific context of a notice of alibi
order. Two defendants were prosecuted for murder and a host of lesser
offenses in the armed robbery of a west Los Angeles discount store.
Both the defense and the prosecution moved for and received pretrial
discovery orders. The prosecution's order required the defendants to
state the names, addresses, and written statements of each alibi witness
they intended to call. Affirming the order and the defendants' subse-
quent conviction, the supreme court determined that Jones had given
the prosecution the right to discover defense evidence "within certain
narrow limitations." 9 Without alluding precisely to what those limita-
tions were, the majority held that Jones authorized the trial court to
issue the alibi order."0
Lopez, however, did more than just extend the Jones rationale to
court orders for discovery of an intended alibi defense. While Jones
had involved an accused who had voluntarily disclosed his intent to
assert an affirmative defense,51 in Lopez, since the order preceded the
defendant's declaration, there was no voluntary disclosure by the de-
fendants. Subsequently, in People v. Dugas,"2 Lopez was construed to
include notice of alibi orders within prosecutorial discovery. There the
First District Court of Appeal affirmed a conviction where the trial
court issued a discovery order requiring the disclosure of names and
47. In Jones, the prosecution learned of the defendant's affirmative defense from the
defendant's attorney who, in seeking a continuance on the day of trial, informed the
court of the nature of the defense. Had Jones been limited to permitting discovery under
these rare circumstances, the case would have had far less impact in the development of
notice procedure. This potentially limited application of Jones was noted in Justice
Dooling's dissent. 58 Cal. 2d at 69, 372 P.2d at 927, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 887.
48. 60 Cal. 2d 223, 384 P.2d 16, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1963).
49. Id. at 244, 384 P.2d at 28, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 436.
50. The majority opinion, written by Justice Schauer, was also careful to note that
neither -the trial record nor the briefs of either party gave any indication that the
defendants had, in fact, complied with the trial court, and thus the defendants could
show no prejudice resulting from the order. Id.
51. Slee note 47 supra.
52. 242 Cal. App. 2d 244, 51 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1966).
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addresses of all intended defense witnesses supporting "any affirmative
defense, such as alibi."53  Citing Lopez, Judge Shoemaker's majority
opinion concluded that it did not matter that the order was issued before
the defendants indicated their intent to rely upon a particular affirmative
defense, so long as the defendants did in fact subsequently so rely.
54
Three years after Lopez, the California Supreme Court reviewed
notice of alibi procedure in People. v. Pike.55 There the defendants
appealed a conviction for first-degree murder, contending, inter alia, that
a pretrial discovery order requiring them to reveal the names, addresses,
and expected testimony of all defense witnesses was prejudicial and
required reversal. Justice McComb's majority opinion sustained the
blanket pretrial discovery order, concluding that such orders were per-
mitted by Jones, enabled the prosecution to function more effectively,
and did not abridge the "defendant's right of privacy, freedom from self-
incrimination or the attorney-client privilege. '5 6  Although the dissent
in Pike bitterly assailed the majority's conclusory holding and its failure
to properly apply Jones,"7 it was apparent from the majority's brief
consideration of the issue that the California Supreme Court was content
to expand Jones.58 Pike assured trial courts that notice of alibi or other
orders mandating prior notice of affirmative defenses could be freely
issued by judges without reference to a defendant's voluntary disclosures
or declared intentions. The First District Court of Appeal in Ruiz v.
Superior Court59 applied Pike without hesitancy in determining that the
trial court had the right to "require defense counsel to supply the names
and addresses and expected testimony of defense witnesses without
limitation to affirmative defenses."'60
53. Id. at 249, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 481.
54. Id. The decision was devoid of any supporting authority for its blanket assertions.
For a critical analysis of the court's failure to analyze the appellants' arguments see
McMullen v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. App. 3d 224, 227 n.1, 85 Cal. Rptr. 729, 731 n.1
(1970).
55. 71 Cal. 2d 595, 455 P.2d 776, 78 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1969).
56. Id. at 605, 455 P.2d at 781-82, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 677-78.
57. In Justice Peters' view:
This statement of the prosecution's right to pretrial discovery is far too broad, is
not supported by Jones and demonstrates a callous disregard of a defendant's consti-
tutional, statutory and common law rights.
Id. at 610, 455 P.2d at 784, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
58. In a decision released one day after the expansive Pike decision, the Second
District Court of Appeals held that discovery orders under Jones were limited to
discovery of affirmative defenses. McGuire v. Superior Court, 274 Cal. App. 2d 583,
597, 79 Cal. Rptr. 155, 162-63 (1969).
59. 275 Cal. App. 2d 633, 80 Cal. Rptr. 523 (1969).
60. Id. at 635, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 524.
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C. Prudhomme v. Superior Court: The Transition
Prudhomme v. Superior Court1 marked a fundamental shift away
from the California Supreme Court's expansive application of Jones and
profoundly altered California's judicially adopted notice of alibi proce-
dure. Like Jones, the case did not involve a notice of alibi order per se
but was to have significant impact on alibi procedure. The defendant
was ordered through her attorney to provide the piosecution with the
names, addresses, and expected testimony of each Witness she intended
to call. It was apparent that the trial court judge was relying upon the
intent-to-disclose-at-trial rationale from Jones, w ifch had been given
expansive application in Pike. 2
Justice Burke, speaking for six members of the supreme court,03 held
that the order exceeded the trial court's power and was thus void.0 4 It
was not enough, said Justice Burke, that the order was based upon
"whether the information sought pertains to an affirmative defense, or
whether the defendant intends to introduce or rely upon the evidence at
trial."65 The court must additionally determine whether the disclosure
"might conceivably lighten the prosecution's burden of proving its case
in chief."00  This factor, which had been summarily disposed of in
Jones and scarcely dealt with in Pike, was the sine qua non'in determin-
ing whether or not discovery should be permitted. 67 The trial court's
order in Prudhomme was defective because it was not limited to any
particular defense and did not permit the trial judge to determine the
possible incriminatory effect of any disclosures made thereunder.0 8
Underlying Prudhomme's departure from the expansive Lopez and
Pike decisions was the concern for the defendant's constitutional privi-
61. 2 Cal. 3d 320, 466 P.2d 673, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970).
62. See note 45 supra and accompanying text. The appellate record in both Pike and
Prudhomme does not reveal the precise terms of the trial court orders in each case, but it
is apparent that the orders in each instance required disclosure of the names and
addresses of all witnesses which the accused intended to call. Prudho'mme v. Superior
Court, 2 Cal. 3d 320, 322, 466 P.2d 673, 674, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129, 130 (1970); People v.
Pike, 71 Cal. 2d 595, 605, 455 P.2d 776, 781-82, 78 Cal. Rptr. 672, 677-78 (1969).
63. 2 Cal. 3d at 322, 466 P.2d at 674, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 130. Justice Peters concurred
in a separate opinion, adding that Jones and Pike should be "forthrightly disapproved and
not given a further uncertain and confused life." Id. at 328, 466 P.2d at 678, 85 Cal.
Rptr. at 134.
64. Id. at 322, 466 P.2d at 674, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
65. Id. at 326, 466 P.2d at 677, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 133, citing Jones v. Superior Court,
59 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 327, 466 P.2d at 678, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
68. Id.
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lege against self-incrimination. Justice Burke noted "certain significant
developments in the law since Jone which obligated the court to limit
that case to its facts until the court considered the effects that a discov-
ery order would have upon accused's rights and privileges, "especially
his fundamental right not to be compelled to be a witness against
himself."69  Among the developments cited by the majority were the
United States Supreme Court's decision expanding the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination to state criminal proceedings; '0 the
limited nature of prosecutorial discovery under recently enacted rule
16(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; 71 the recent disap-
proval by a federal district court within the Ninth Circuit of California's
prosecutorial discovery procedures;72 and the United States Supreme
Court's recent grant of certiorari to review Florida's notice of alibi
procedure.7 3  These developments, coupled with California's recogni-
tion that the fifth amendment privilege was a mainstay of the accusatori-
al system, 74 prompted the Prudhomme court to disapprove of its prior
expansive reading of Jones."5
The effect of Prudhomme upon California's notice of alibi procedure
was far from certain. The majority opinion did not bar prosecutorial
69. Id. at 323, 466 P.2d at 675, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
70. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
71. Rule 16(c), enacted in 1966, created a limited form of prosecutorial discovery of
certain tangible evidence which the defendant intended to introduce at trial. FED. R.
CRIm. P. 16(c). The Prudhomme court was reluctant to sanction a procedure that
would go beyond the limited federal procedure. 2 Cal. 3d at 324, 466 P.2d at 676, 85
Cal. Rptr. at 131.
72. 2 Cal. 3d at 324-25, 466 P.2d at 676, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 132. The case referred to
was Cantillon v. Superior Court, 305 F. Supp. 304 (C.D. Cal. 1969), remanded, 442
F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1971), which involved a habeas corpus action by the attorney for
the defendant. The defense counsel refused to comply with the trial court's notice of
alibi order and was jailed for contempt. The federal court adopted the spirit of Justice
Peters' dissent in Jones declaring:
This Court is familiar with the decisions of the California courts as well as the
decisions from other jurisdictions cited by respondents in support of their claim that
the names of alibi witnesses can be obtained by pretrial discovery from a defendant
in a criminal case. This Court however, respectfully is of the opinion that to re-
quire such discovery from this defendant is a violation of such defendant's Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent when such attempted discovery is sought.
305 F. Supp. at 307. Following Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), Cantillon was
remanded with the circuit court cautiously noting "the Supreme Court placed express
limitations on the [Williams] holding." 442 F.2d at 1338.
73. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). The case was argued March 4, 1970,
some three weeks before the Prudhomme decision was announced. The respondent's
brief cited Jones as authority for the proposition that not all evidence obtained from a
defendant is protected by the fifth amendment. Brief for Respondent at 23, Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
74. 2 Cal. 3d at 325, 466 P.2d at 676-77, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 132-34.
75. Id. at 327 n.1l, 466 P.2d at 677-78 n.ll, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 134-35 n.11.
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discovery.76  Prosecutorial discovery of factual information pertaining
to specific affirmative defenses was permissible where the demand was
(1) for information which the defendant intended to introduce at trial,
and (2) the trial judge determined the disclosure would not be self-
incriminatory.77
California's lower appellate courts applied Prudhomme's standard
78
to court-fashioned notice of alibi orders with divergent results. The
Second District Court of Appeal, in People v. Hall,79 approved a trial
court order which called for disclosure of the identity of all intended
alibi witnesses and penalized failure to disclose by barring the defend-
ant's non-noticed alibi testimony and evidence. 0 Justice Thompson,
considering Prudhomme's impact upon prosecutorial discovery, declared
that there was "no way in which the disclosure would have lightened the
prosecution's burden of proving its case in chief."'81
The First District Court of Appeal in Rodriguez v. Superior Court,8"
took a position directly opposed to that of People v. Hall by invalidating
a trial court order requiring disclosure of the names, addresses, and
76. Id. at 327, 466 P.2d at 678, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
77. Id.
78. The standard referred to is that set forth in the Prudhomme majority opinion:
We do not intend to suggest that the prosecution should be barred from any discov-
ery in this, or any other, case. A reasonable demand for factual information which,
as in lones, pertains to a particular defense or defenses, and seeks only that infor-
mation which defendant intends to introduce at trial, may present no substantial
hazards of self-incrimination and therefore justify the trial judge in determining that
under the facts and circumstances in the case before him it clearly appears that dis-
closure cannot possibly tend to incriminate defendant. However, unless those cri-
teria are met, discovery should be refused.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
79. 7 Cal. App. 3d 562, 86 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1970).
80. Id. at 566, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 506-507. The constitutional validity of preclusion of
the defendant's alibi evidence and witnesses is an issue hotly debated by critics of notice
of alibi procedures. See, e.g., Comment, Preclusion Sanction-A Violation of the
Constitutional Right to Present a Defense, 81 YALE L.J. 1342 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Preclusion Sanction].
81. 7 Cal. App. 3d at 566, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 506-07. It was apparent from
this decision that Justice Thompson felt Prudhomme permitted the notice of alibi orders
because they pertained to a particular affirmative defense and sought only information
which the defendant intended to rely upon at trial. This is the first factor which the
trial judge must consider under Prudhomme. 2 Cal. 3d at 327, 466 P.2d at 678, 85 Cal.
Rptr. at 134. The second factor (i.e., whether it appears that the disclosure might
conceivably lighten the prosecution's burden) was summarily dealt with in Hall by
simply indicating Prudhomme would be no bar to notice of alibi orders. 7 Cal. App. 3d
at 566, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 506-07. Prudhomme itself gave some indication that notice of
alibi orders might be acceptable under its standards. See note 76 supra and accompany-
ing text.
82. 9 Cal. App. 3d 493, 88 Cal. Rptr. 154 (1970).
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expected testimony of all alibi witnesses. The court noted that, al-
though the United States Supreme Court in Williams v. Florida3 had
recently upheld Florida's notice of alibi procedure, the Prudhomme
holding specifically disapproved of earlier California cases upon which
judicial authority for notice of alibi orders was based.8 4  Absent a
statutory enactment which guaranteed reciprocal discovery rights for the
accused, Rodriguez concluded that there was no authority under the
Prudhomme rationale for a trial court to order pretrial disclosures of the
defendant's alibi witnesses.8 5
The split between the first district's Rodriguez decision and the
second district's holding in Hall was to remain until Reynolds v.
Superior Court.86 The first district continued to read Prudhomme as
having eliminated authority for judicial notice of alibi orders.8'7 The
second district, on the other -hand, continued to hold that discovery
orders could be fashioned to assist the prosecution in locating and
impeaching alibi witnesses without violating the privilege against self-
incrimination. 88
D. Reynolds v. Superior Court: The Judicial Retreat
In Reynolds v. Superior Court,89 the California Supreme Court de-
clared an end to judicially created notice of alibi procedure. At issue
83. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
84. 9 Cal. App. 3d at 495-96, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 155. Prudhomme disapproved People
v. Pike, 71 Cal. 2d 959, 455 P.2d 776, 78 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1969); Ruiz v. Superior Court,
275 Cal. App. 2d 633, 80 Cal. Rptr. 523 (1969); MeGuire v. Superior Court, 274 Cal.
App. 2d 583, 79 Cal. Rptr. 155 (1969); and People v. Dugas, 242 Cal. App. 2d 244, 51
Cal. Rptr. 478 (1966), to the extent those cases were inconsistent with the holding of
that case. 2 Cal. 3d at 328, 466 P.2d at 678, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
85. 9 Cal. App. 3d at 496-97, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 155-56.
86. 12 Cal. 3d 834, 837 n.1, 528 P.2d 45, 46 n.1, 117 Cal. Rptr. 437, 438 n.1 (1974).
87. See, e.g., People v. Bais, 31 Cal. App. 3d 663, 107 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1973), where
the First District Court of Appeal reversed defendant's armed robbery conviction because
the trial court had granted the prosecution's motion to discover statements made by alibi
witnesses to a public defender's investigator.
88. In a case later withdrawn from publication, Justice Older attempted to harmonize
the divergent results in the districts' applications of Prudhomme by explaining:
Mhe statement in Bais that discovery must be denied if it will conceivably lighten
the burden which the prosecution bears in "bringing about the conviction of the ac-
cused" is not to be taken literally. Impeaching matter is discoverable although im-
peaching the credibility of a defense witness aids the prosecution in bringing about
a conviction. It is only if the statement contains "other non-impeaching collateral
matter which might be of assistance to the prosecution in proving its case" that any
question of self-incrimination is raised under Prudhomme.
People v. Cox, Crim. No. 22284 (Cal. App. Ct., 2d Dist., June 27, 1974) (opinion ap-
pearing at 40 A.C.A.3d 259 (1974) ordered withdrawn from publication by California
Supreme Court Aug. 21, 1974).
89. 12 Cal. 3d 834, 528 P.2d 45, 117 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1974).
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was a trial court order which required the defendant to give to the state
pretrial notice of the names and addresses of each of his alibi witnesses.
The prosecution, in turn, was required to list the witnesses it would call
to impeach the defendant's alibi witnesses. 90 The testimony of witness-
es from either side whose identity had not been disclosed before trial
would be excluded. 91 Citing "complex and closely balanced questions
of Federal and State constitutional law," the court held that the trial
court lacked authority to issue the order.
92
The unanimous Reynolds decision did not apply Prudhomme's con-
struction of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination or
declare that judicial notice of alibi orders were constitutionally void.
Instead, the court reviewed the history of prosecutorial discovery 8
orders in California through Prudhomme, contrasted it with the apparent
lack of concern for the privilege against self-incrimination shown by the
United States Supreme Court, and concluded that California, as a result
of Prudhomme, was "on record as being more solicitous of the privilege
against self-incrimination than federal law currently requires.""4  The
court concluded the order was an unauthorized exercise of the trial
court's limited rule-making power."
The Reynolds holding narrowly circumscribed judicial rule-making
power. California courts, unlike jurisdictions in which the judicial
branch of government is specifically granted the quasi-legislative power
to enact rules of judicial procedure, 90 had no such power. Notice of
90. Id. at 836, 528 P.2d at 45-46, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 437-38. Note that the prosecution
was not required to disclose the identity of -those witnesses whom it intended to call to
establish the defendant's presence at the scene of the crime. But see, Proposed
Amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District
Courts, 62 F.R.D. 271, 292-95 (1974) (proposed rule 12.1).
91. 12 Cal. 3d at 836, 528 P.2d at 45-46, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 437-38. Neither the trial
court nor the supreme court decided whether this preclusion sanction was intended to
apply to the defendant's own testimony as well. Even staunch advocates of notice of
alibi orders, however, have felt there was little or no justification for applying the
preclusion sanction to bar the defendant's own alibi testimony. See, e.g., LAw REVISION
Comm'N, supra note 13.
92. 12 Cal. 3d at 837, 528 P.2d at 46, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 837-43, 528 P.2d at 46-51, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 438-43.
95. The court admitted its power to create judicial rules necessary to protect constitu-
tional rights but hesitated to employ its rule-making power to create "judicial procedures
which are in no way required by higher law but which may seem to some socially
desirable. . . ... Id. at 846, 528 P.2d at 52, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 444.
96. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1970) (giving the United States Supreme Court the
power to promulgate rules of procedure, subject to congressional approval); ARIZ. CONST.
art. VI, § 5.5 (giving the Arizona Supreme Court power to make all rules of
procedure); N.J. CoNsr. art. VI, § 2(3) (supreme court to make all rules govern-
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alibi orders, the court concluded, while socially desirable from the
standpoint of preventing surprise and assisting the state's prosecutorial
function, were not among the courts' inherent powers.
97
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUEs PRESENTED BY
NOTICE OF ALIBI RULES
Reynolds effectively concluded prior judicial controversy and uncer-
tainty as to the validity of judicial notice of alibi procedures, but it
offered neither proposals nor guidance as to a statutory notice proce-
dure. By failing to rule upon the constitutional infirmities of notice of
alibi procedures, the court did not determine what type of notice proce-
dure would comport with Prudhomme's fifth amendment mandate that
court-ordered disclosures must not "possibly tend to incriminate."98 The
issue of the scope of prosecutorial discovery had been initiated in
Jones.99 Prudhomme had limited Jones' potentially wide-open rule of
disclosure by emphasizing the privilege against self-incrimination;100
however, no court has articulated or specifically applied Prudhomme's
standard to notice of alibi procedures. Thus, legislative drafters must
examine the constitutional issues in *order to develop a statutory notice
procedure which will comport with Prudhomme, yet retain the utility of
a notice procedure.
A. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Opponents of notice of alibi procedures have long maintained that the
procedures violate the accused's constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination. 10 1 Justice Bradley, writing for the Supreme Court in
1886, declared unequivocally that a discovery order compelling an
accused to furnish information to be used to convict himself of a crime
was "contrary to the principles of a free government."'102 Requiring the
ing practice and procedure); PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c) (supreme court to make
such rules as are consistent with constitution).
97. 12 Cal. 3d at 849-50, 528 P.2d at 55, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
98. See notes 69-70 supra and accompanying text.
99. For a discussion of the application of Jones in the context of prosecutorial
discovery see generally D. LOuiSELL & B. WALLY, MODERN CALIFoRNIA DiSCoVERY 900-
02 (2d ed. 1972).
100. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
101. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V provides in part: "No person.. . shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . ." The privilege, embodied in the
fifth amendment and directly applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment,
forbids the prosecution from compelling the defendant to be a witness against himself.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
102. Now it is elementary knowledge that one cardinal rule the court of chancery
1976] 407
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
defendant to inform the prosecution of his intent to rely upon an alibi
and to furnish the names and addresses of alibi witnesses to be called
forces the defendant to assist in his own prosecution.10 3 The informa-
tion which the defendant furnishes to the state alerts the prosecution to
the alibi issue, permitting the prosecution to strengthen its case against
the accused. The state is able to further investigate its case and locate
witnesses who will rebut the alibi defense and/or impeach the defend-
ant's alibi witnesses.
Proponents of notice of alibi procedures contend that, since the
defendant freely elects to rely upon an alibi defense, there is no compul-
sion under the order other than to accelerate the timing of the disclo-
sure.104 Procedural notice of alibi is nothing more than a pleading
requirement conditioning the alibi plea upon prior notice. Moreover,
disclosures required by alibi orders are evidentiary, not testimonial,
and the fifth amendment does not prevent such compulsory disclosures
even if they prove incriminatory. 10 5 Furthermore, proponents closely
reason that an alibi defense is exculpatory rather than inculpatory;
therefore, there is no self-incriminatory effect to the rule. 100 Finally,
the proponents rest their argument with the observation that the salutory
is never to decree a discovery which might tend to convict the party of crime or
to forfeit his property. And any compulsory discovery by extorting the party's oath
or compelling production of his private books and papers to convict of a crime...
is contrary to the principles of a free government.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 631-32 (1886).
103. See generally Louisell, Criminal Discovery and Self-Incrimination: Roger Tray-
nor Confronts the Dilemma, 53 CALir. L. Rv. 89 (1965); Smith & McCollum,
Counterdiscovery in Criminal Cases: Fifth Amendment Privileges Abridged, 54 A.B.A.J.
256 (1968); Moore, Criminal Discovery, 19 HASnTNGS LI. 865, 910-17 (1968).
104. See, e.g., People v. Schade, 292 N.Y.S. 612 (Queens County Ct. 1936), which up-
held New York's early notice of alibi law, reasoning, inter alia, that such a rule merely
directs a defendant to give information where he intends to rely upon the defense of
alibL
105. The United States Supreme Court in a series of decisions has established that the
privilege against self-incrimination applies only to testimonial as opposed to evidentiary
disclosures and thus does not apply to such evidentiary activities as compelling the
defendant to try on clothing allegedly worn by the suspect (Holt v. United States, 218
U.S. 245 (1910)), to submit to a line-up and give voice samples (United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218 (1967)), to submit to a blood test (Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966)), or to provide specimens of handwriting, (Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263
(1967)).
106. In People v. Schade, 292 N.Y.S. 612 (Queens County Ct. 1936), the court per
Judge Colden remarked:
Certain it is that no innocent person can in any manner be injured by this [notice
of alibil statute. It is equally certain that the activities of criminals in manufactur-
ing alibi defenses will be severely checked. ...
Id. at 619.
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effects of such rules so far outweigh the self-incrimination privilege that
the procedures should be upheld under a balancing analysis.0 7
Most courts have accepted the proponents' arguments and have ruled
that notice of alibi procedures, whether statutory or judicially promul-
gated, do not violate the privilege against self-incrimination.' 0 8 The
rationales advanced are not entirely convincing because a notice of alibi
order does compel the defendant to assess in advance of trial whether he
will need to employ an alibi defense. He cannot elect to wait for trial,
view the effect of the prosecution's case, and then assert this defense.10 9
Furthermore, disclosures required by the rule would appear testimonial,
rather than evidentiary, because it is the accused who must prepare a list
of names, addresses, and, in some jurisdictions, the intended testimony of
his alibi witnesses."' Finally, it is by no means certain that disclosure
of an honest alibi defense cannot be incriminatory; it may be that the
state, with the time to prepare afforded by notice requirements, will be
able to so effectively attack the credibility of the accused's alibi witnesses
or to intimidate the defendant's witnesses as to destroy their effective-
ness."' Conversely, the alibi witnesses may prove to be sources of
information concerning other unrelated and uncharged criminal activity.
For these reasons, it is apparent that notice of alibi procedures are not
entirely devoid of self-incriminatory consequences.
The United States Supreme Court in Williams v. Florida"2 summari-
ly dealt with the self-incrimination issue, denying that alibi notice violat-
107. Comment, The Self-Incrimination Privilege: Barrier to Criminal Discovery?, 51
CA'. L. R . 135, 140 (1963) (noting that the privilege has lost much of its utility in a
modem context where the criminal defendant usually elects to testify and thereby
submits to cross-examination because his failure to speak appears suspicious).
108. See, e.g., State V. Angeleri, 241 A.2d 3, 5 (N.J. 1968); People v. Schulenberg,
112 N.Y.S.2d 374 (App. Div. 1952); State v. Thayer, 176 N.E. 656 (Ohio 1931); Simos
v. Burke, 163 N.W.2d 177, 180 (Wis. 1968). See also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78 (1970).
109. See, e.g., Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 66, 372 P.2d 919, 925, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 879, 885 (1962) (Peters, J., dissenting):
Until today, in California, a defendant could weigh his proposed defense against
the prosecution's case, and not make up his mind until he heard the strength or
weakness of the case against him whether he would rely on a straight not guilty
defense or urge an affirmative defense.
110. See, e.g., A= R. CRim. P. 15.2(c) (1974); IowA CobB ANN. § 777.18 (1950).
111. This point was recognized by Justice Burke:
It requires no great effort of imagination to conceive of a variety of situations
wherein the disclosure of the expected testimony of defense witnesses could easily
provide an essential link in a chain of evidence underlying the prosecution's case
in chief.
Pmdhomme v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 320, 326, 466 P.2d 673, 677, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129,
133 (1970).
112. 399 U.S. 78, 83 n.13 (1970).
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ed the privilege. Noting that nothing in the Florida notice of alibi
statutory procedure forced the defendant to adhere to an alibi defense if
he wished to later change strategy,11 Justice White found no more
compulsion to make pretrial disclosure than would be present at trial1 1 4
were the accused to rely upon an alibi. The fifth amendment did not
enable the accused to wait until the prosecution presented its case
"before announcing the nature of his defense." '15  In concluding its
decision, the Court noted that even without a notice rule, the prosecu-
tion could move for a continuance to further investigate should an
unexpected alibi defense be asserted, and therefore it was permissible
under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to accomplish the same
result through pretrial discovery. 1 6 The Williams holding on the self-
incrimination issue has precluded this avenue of constitutional challenge
to notice of alibi procedures." 7
113. Id. at 84.
114. Id. at 84-85.
115. Id. at 85.
116. Id. at 86. The dissent in Williams, written by Justice Black in which Justice
Douglas joined, opposed the majority's treatment of the self-incrimination issue. Id. at
106-16. They reasoned that at the pretrial phase, the defendant could only guess what
the state's case might be and the notice rule forced him to gamble as to the desirability of
pleading alibi. Id. at 109. Furthermore, the procedure could prejudice the defendant
even should he later abandon the defense, because it compelled him to disclose names
and addresses of persons having knowledge about the defendant and his activities. Id. at
110. It was therefore error to assume the accused's pretrial disclosure through the notice
rule was the same as requiring the defendant to plead alibi in his case in chief because he
had not yet seen the prosecution's case. Id. at 110. To this extent, Justice Black's
opinion was similar to Justice Peters' dissent in Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56,
62-68, 372 P.2d 919, 922-26, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879, 882-86 (1962). See also People v.
Talle, 111 Cal. App. 2d 650, 667, 245 P.2d 633, 643 (1952) (terming any effort to com-
pel the accused to give testimony prior to the establishment of a prima facie case against
him a "shocking and prejudicial invasion of appellant's constitutional rights"). The Wil-
liams dissent concluded that the notice procedure violated the privilege against self-
incrimination and could not be justified on the grounds that it facilitated the ascertain-
ment of truth. 399 U.S. at 113-14.
117. Where the issue has been raised, state courts have declined to rule that notice of
alibi orders violate the state's constitutional or statutory right to be heard and the right
to remain silent. See, e.g., Sikora v. District Court, 462 P.2d 897 (Mont. 1969)
(holding that the notice order merely required disclosure of information to be used at
trial). The arguments advanced by both sides are the same as those made with respect
to the self-incrimination issue discussed supra. See generally Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d 958,
971 (1972). The results have been the same whether the asserted right was guaranteed
by the state constitution or by a state statute. Compare Simos v. Burke, 163 N.W.2d 177
(Wis. 1968) (holding that Wisconsin's notice of alibi statute did not violate the
defendant's state constitutional right to be heard), with Smetana v. State, 2 N.E.2d 778
(Ohio App. 1936) (holding, inter alia, that where the right to be heard was created by
statute, it could similarly be limited by a subsequent statute prescribing notice of alibi
rules).
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B. Due Process
Due process attacks have been made against notice procedures based
upon the fundamental unfairness of requiring the accused to reveal
information in advance of trial thus assisting the prosecution in meeting
its burden of proof."' To require the defendant to make detailed
disclosures where the prosecution is under no reciprocal duty" 9 to
furnish information to the accused, and to require advance disclosure as
to the nature of his defense, is to require the defendant to assist in the
prosecution's task of establishing each element of the crime charged.
Williams quickly disposed of the due process challenge to Florida's
notice of alibi rule.'20 The court first noted that the Florida procedure,
unlike that of many other jurisdictions, was "carefully hedged with
reciprocal duties requiring state disclosures to the defendant" and ad-
vanced important state interests. 2' The court concluded that a proce-
dure which furthered the truth-finding function of the trial process by
permitting both the defendant and the state to investigate certain facts
relating to guilt or innocence was not fundamentally unfair.122  The due
process issue received further treatment by the United States Supreme
Court in Wardius v. Oregon.2 s Writing for the majority, Justice
Marshall invalidated Oregon's notice of alibi statute on due process
grounds for failure to expressly require reciprocal disclosures by the
118. See U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person shall. . . be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law .... ; U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1: "[Nlor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law
." The due process issue presented by notice of alibi procedures is, to this extent,
akin to the fundamental fairness procedural guarantees set forth in Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165 (1952).
119. The concept that requiring reciprocal disclosures from the state and the accused
would satisfy due process is based on a waiver rationale. It is reasoned that the accused
could elect to waive his constitutional protections to obtain discovery from the prosecu-
tion, and that the prosecution's right to obtain discovery from the accused is conditioned
upon prior disclosures given to the defense. 39 F.R.D. 317 (1966).
The waiver rationale, used to satisfy due process, has been challenged by critics of
prosecutorial discovery, including Justice Douglas who questioned whether it was any
less a violation of the accused's constitutional rights that his right to conduct discovery
was "conditioned on the abandonment of constitutional rights." Amendments to Rules
of Civil Procedure, Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims,
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 277 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting in
part).
120. 399 U.S. at 81-82.
121. "Given the ease with which an alibi can be fabricated, the State's interest in
protecting itself against an eleventh hour defense is both obvious and legitimate." Id.
at81,
122. Id. at 82.
123. 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
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state and the defendant. 2 4  While heralding the beneficial impact of
notice of alibi and admitting that due process places no limits on the
scope of discovery available to both sides, Wardius held that due process
mandates a "balance of forces between the accused and the accuser."'12
Justice Marshall reduced due process to its essence in holding that "it
was fundamentally unfair to require the defendant to divulge the details
of his own case" and then subject him to the risk of surprise concerning
refutation of the very evidence he had been obliged to disclose.' 20 While
the opinion did not elaborate upon the extent of reciprocal disclosures
required, Justice Marshall did state that the reciprocity demanded by
due process included more than "merely informing the defendant of the
time and place of the crime."' 27
The Wardius decision had an immediate impact upon those states
with notice of alibi statutes or rules that did not provide reciprocal
discovery rights. 25 It was not sufficient that existing notice statutes
might be judicially interpreted to provide reciprocal rights; Wardius had
specifically rejected this argument. 29  Many statutes were promptly
amended or rewritten. 30 In long term effect, however, Wardius did not
constitute a victory for opponents of notice of alibi procedures because,
as Justice Douglas maintained, although the procedure prescribed by
the Court increased the evidence available to both sides, it altered the
balance between the accused and the state "as struck by the Constitu-
$i1.' 181
tion." 3
C. The Right to Compulsory Process
The sixth amendment guarantees the accused the right to have com-
pulsory process to summon witnesses. 3 2 The clause has been construed
124. Id. at 476-79.
125. Id. at 474.
126. Id. at 476.
127. Id. at 478 n.12.
128. In addition to Oregon, virtually all states with notice of alibi rules failed to
provide expressly for reciprocal discovery obligations. See, e.g., IOWA Coy ANN. §
777.18 (1950); KAN. STAT. AN. § 62-1341 (1964); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 630.14 (1947);
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2745.58 (1954). Following Wardius, New York declared its
existing notice of alibi procedure unconstitutional (People v. Bush, 308 N.E.2d 451
(N.Y. 1973)) and Pennsylvania repealed PA. ROLE Cim4. PRoc. § 312 (Supp. 1974).
129. 412 U.S. at 477.
130. Following the decision in Bush (see note 128 supra), New York enacted a new
statute expressly providing for reciprocal disclosures aimed at meeting the Wardius
requirement. N.Y. Cim. PRoc. LAw § 250.20 (McKinney Supp. 1974). To date, other
jurisdictions have not followed suit.
131. 412 U.S. at 479-80 (Douglas, J., concurring).
132. U.S. CONST. amend. VI states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right. . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses. .... "
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by the United States Supreme Court to afford the defendant in state and
federal prosecutions the right to present all relevant and material testi-
mony and evidence in his behalf.1"' Notice of alibi statutes and rules in
most state courts and rule 12.1 in the federal district courts permit the
trial court, in its discretion, to preclude the defense presentation of the
testimony of any alibi witness whose identity has not been disclosed in
advance to the prosecution.1'3  Notice of alibi opponents attack this
sanction ds an unconstitutional abridgment of the defendant's right to
have compulsory process.' 35  The sixth amendment at minimum dic-
tates that less drastic sanctions be employed to effect compliance with
disclosure orders, such as granting the state a continuance, imposing
criminal contempt sanctions on the accused or his attorney, or permit-
ting comment upon the defendant's failure to comply.
130
State courts have held that preclusion of the defendant's alibi evidence
to penalize non-compliance does not violate the right to have compulso-
ry process. The Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Dodd3 7 concluded
that its preclusion sanction merely prescribed conditions under which an
alibi witness could testify, and did not prevent a defendant from com-
pelling attendance of witnesses. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Commonwealth v. Vecchiole38 determined that the sanction merely
imposed reasonable conditions for the presentation of alibi witnesses.
Such decisions are based in part upon recognition that only possible
preclusion of the alibi defense is sufficiently severe to assure compliance
with the disclosure order.'39
The United States Supreme Court has not ruled upon the constitu-
tional validity of the preclusion sanction present in federal and in most
state alibi notice procedures.' 40 Most defendants elect to comply with
133. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), established that the compulsory
process clause of the sixth amendment afforded the accused in a state criminal proceed-
ing the right to present all relevant and material testimony on his behalf.
134. See, e.g., FFD. R. CRIM. P. 12.1. The rule, however, does not bar the accused
himself from presenting alibi testimony regardless of his failure to give notice. As for
the exclusion of the other witnesses, the Advisory Committee felt that the sanction was
essential to the success of the procedure. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 12.1, Advisory Committee Note, 62 F.R.D. 271, 294
(1973).
135. See, Preclusion Sanction, supra note 80, at 1352.
136. Id. at 1364.
137. 418 P.2d 571 (Ariz. 1966).
138. 224 A.2d 96 (Pa. 1966).
139. See, e.g., LAW REVISION CoMM'N, supra note 13, at J-17 (stating that the right to
compulsory process is not unlimited in scope and, in any event, constitutional infirmities
would be overcome by making preclusion discretionary).
140, The issue of preclusion was raised in Williams. See Brief for Virgil Jenkins as
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the notice order when it is issued' 4 ' and raise constitutional issues on
appeal or else to challenge the notice before complying by use of an
extraordinary writ. Defense attorneys are reluctant to deliberately with-
hold the names of alibi witnesses and have their testimony excluded
from trial in the hope that a resulting conviction will be reversed at some
distant date upon appeal to the nation's highest court. 4 2  The contin-
ued reluctance is particularly understandable in view of the United
States Supreme Court's recommendation that Congress adopt rule
12.1's notice of alibi provisions, which include a discretionary preclusion
sanction.143 The Court's decision to propose a comprehensive notice of
alibi rule for federal courts and the subsequent enactment of rule
12.11'4 support the belief that the Court not only favors notice of alibi
procedure rules, but accepts preclusion as a necessary sanction to as-
sure compliance with alibi orders. 45
D. Equal Protection
Illinois' notice of alibi rule 46 was challenged as violative of the
accused's right to equal protection.147  In People v. Halliday,'48 the
defendant urged that the rule discriminated unfairly against defendants
with alibi defenses by compelling them to make pretrial disclosures not
required of other defenses. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the
argument, holding there was reasonable justification for the special
classification based upon the ease with which alibi defenses may be
fabricated and the surprise potential of unanticipated alibi defenses.14'
Amicus Curiae at 17-26, Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). The Court, however,
found it unnecessary to decide the validity of the sanction because the defendant had
elected to comply with the trial court order. See 399 U.S. at 83 n.14.
141. Many appellate challenges to the orders in California were made in the form of
extraordinary writs. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 834, 528 P.2d 45,
117 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1974). Only rarely did the defendant or his counsel ignore the
order and risk contempt or preclusion. See, e.g., In re Marciano, 2 Cal. 3d 329, 466
P.2d 679, 85 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1970).
142. See, e.g., Preclusion Sanction, supra note 80, at 1346.
143. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule
12.1, Advisory Committee Note, 62 F.R.D. 271, 292 (1973); FED. R. CiUM. P. 12.1(d).
144. The new federal alibi procedure was enacted on July 31, 1975, along with
amendments and other additions to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Pub. L.
No. 94-64, 89 Stat. 370 (July 31, 1975).
145. See Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules Criminal Procedure Rule 12.1,
Advisory Committee Note, 62 F.R.D. 271, 293-95 (1973).
146. ILL. REv. STAT. § 114-14 (1968) (held unconstitutional in People v. Cline, 311
N.E.2d 599 (Ill. 1974), for failure to provide reciprocal discovery rights).
147. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
148. 265 N.E.2d 634 (Ill. 1970).
149. Id. at 635.
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The equal protection argument is not likely to be well received in other
jurisdictions. The alibi defense is distinct from other affirmative de-
fenses such as insanity, diminished capacity, and former jeopardy, and
this special character of the alibi defense justifies its special treatment
among affirmative defenses. 150
IV. CALIFORNIA EFFORTS TO PASS NOTICE
OF ALIBI RULES
Prudhomme has made it difficult to formulate a statutory notice of
alibi procedure because it raised the privilege against self-incrimination
as a potential barrier to all prosecutorial discovery by limiting such
discovery to matters which "cannot possibly have a tendency to incrimi-
nate the [defendant]." 151 This high regard for the privilege against
self-incrimination, expressly reaffirmed in Reynolds, contrasts with the
summary treatment of the privilege in other jurisdictions.
52
Reynolds is a clear mandate for legislative enactment of a notice of
alibi procedure, but the legislative history of prior attempts indicates a
general reluctance to do so. The initial effort to enact a statutory no-
tice procedure in California was made in 1926 with the support of the
State Bar.153  The 1931 California Crime Commission Report voiced
strong support for a statute, but no measure was enacted. 154 In 1961,
the California Law Revision Commission undertook an extensive study
of alibi rules, recommending adoption of a statutory scheme analogous
to that later established under rule 12.1 of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure.' 55 Bills were introduced in both the Senate and the
Assembly in response to the Commission's report, yet neither measure
passed in the face of strong opposition from the State Bar, which feared
intimidation of defense witnesses by the prosecution would result from
150. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
151. Although no court to date has so construed Prudhomme, the language of the
decision is vague enough to support arguments of both advocates and opponents of the
notice procedure. Prudhomme v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 320, 327, 466 P.2d 673, 677-
78, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129, 133-34 (1970).
152. See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82 (1970). See also Annot., 45
A.L.R.3d 958 (citing cases in other jurisdictions holding that notice of alibi procedure
does not infringe upon the privilege against self-incrimination).
153. CAL. BAR Assoc. PROC. 248 (1925-1926). Chief Justice Earl Warren, then
serving as Alameda County District Attorney, endorsed the proposal. See note 14 supra.
1931 CAL. CiME CoM'N R P. 10, 2 Appendix to J.S. SEN. & ASSEM. (1933 Reg.
Sess.).
154. Id.
155. Wilson, A Study Relating to Notice of Alibi in Criminal Actions, in LAw
R.visION COmm'N, supra note 13, at J-9.
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the advance disclosures. 5 6 Subsequent efforts to enact the Law Revi-
sion Commission's draft have also been unsuccessful.
5 7
The 1961 Law Revision Commission's proposed statutory notice of
alibi procedure meets the federal constitutional requirements set forth in
Williams and Wardius-58 and provides a model of one type of procedure
that could be enacted. It permits the prosecution to initiate the disclo-
sure process by serving the accused with a written demand for notice of
defendant's intent to assert an alibi defense. 150 The prosecution's writ-
ten demand is. accompanied by a list containing the names of all
witnesses upon whom the prosecution intends to rely to establish defend-
ant's presence at the scene of the crime. 160  In return, the defendant's
notice gives his precise location at the date and time of the offense and
the name and address of eaoh individual upon whom the defendant in-
tends to rely at trial to establish his alibi defense.'"" Failure to comply
with the notice requirement by either party, permits the trial court to
exclude the testimony of any witness whose name is not disclosed, with
the exception of the defendant himself.'1
2
Because of the reluctance of Reynolds to set forth constitutional
guidelines and give substantive meaning to Prudhomme's language pro-
scribing all possible self-incriminatory consequences of compelled prose-
cutorial discovery, it is uncertain whether the Law Revision Commis-
sion's proposal would pass constitutional muster in California.
In Scott v. State,'63 a decision elaborately noted by the Reynolds'
court,"" the Alaska Supreme Court structured a notice of alibi proce-
dure far more restricted than that proposed by the California Law
Revision Commission's 1961 draft. Alaska's comprehensive prosecuto-
rial discovery rule had required the defendant to disclose the names,
addresses, and statements of all defense witnesses with special advance
156. St. Bar Comm. on Crim. Law and Proc., Criminal Law and Procedure, 36 CAL.
STATE BAR J. 480, 487 (1961).
157. See, e.g., S. 1387, 2 SEN. J. 2592-94 (1970 Reg. Sess.) (an amended version of
Senator Cologne's bill that was virtually a verbatim text of the Law Revision Commis-
sion's proposal).
158. The Commission's proposal provides for reciprocal disclosures from both defense
and prosecution. For analysis of the Commission's research see Law REvisioN COMm'N,
supra note 13, at J-8 to J-19.
159. Id. at J-5.
160. Id. at J-7.
161. Id. at J-7, J-8.
162. Id.
163. 519 P.2d 774 (Alas. 1974).
164. See 12 Cal. 3d at 842, 528 P.2d at 49-50, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 441-42.
[Vol. 9
NOTICE OF ALIBI RULE'
notice required of alibi witnesses.' 65 The state supreme court, faced
with a challenge to the rule based upon, inter alia, the privilege against
self-incrimination, concluded that the privilege prevented the trial court
from ordering any testimonial disclosure from the accused. 16 6 The
defendant could thus be required to plead his alibi defense before trial,
but he could not be compelled to assist the prosecution by providing
it with names and addresses of his witnesses.
Scott presents an appealing solution to the problem of how to recon-
cile Prudhomme's concern for the privilege against self-incrimination
with the need for pretrial notice of alibi. The disclosure required
presents a minimal risk of self-incrimination, yet permits the prosecution
to anticipate an alibi defense at time of trial. There is no danger that
the defendant's alibi witnesses will be harassed by zealous prosecution
assistants or that collateral incriminatory materials will be uncovered.
The right of the defendant to remain silent until the prosecution has
argued its case, where such right exists by statute or constitutional
provision, is impaired; however, the potential for self-incrimination is
tremendously reduced. While Scott's notice procedure is far more akin
to a procedural pleading requirement than a discovery tool, notice of
alibi, as originally conceived, was never intended to serve as a discovery
device.' 17  Because the Law Revision Commission so closely approxi-
mates recently enacted rule 12.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 168 it is more probable that the legislature will enact it or a
similar proposal, rather than the Scott-suggested measure, should it
decide that a statutory scheme is needed.
V. CONCLUSION
Californi&s experience with notice of alibi procedure is unique in
many respects. It alone elected to implement the procedure by judicial
decision. It did so almost inadvertently, beginning with the principle
that the state was entitled to discover any information which the accused
intended to disclose at trial. The general assertion was then greatly
pared down by Prudhomme's recognition that the privilege against self-
165. ALAS. R. CRim. P. 16(c).
166. 519 P.2d at 787.
167. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
168. Compare LAw REvIsioN COMM'N, supra note 13, at J-7, J-8 with FED. R.
Cum. P. 12.1. Both measures are carefully hedged with reciprocal disclosure require-
ments, neither precludes the defendant's own alibi testimony regardless of his failure to
give notice, and both permit the trial court in its discretion to preclude the prosecution or
defense alibi witnesses for whom no notice has been given.
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incrimination bars compelled disclosures that might aid the prosecution
in establishing the defendant's guilt. Unable to satisfactorily apply this
rule specifically to its notice of alibi procedure and unwilling to retreat
from the rule, the court in Reynolds simply abandoned the procedure.
What remains is an unsteady silence. On one hand the California
Supreme Court has deferred to the legislature to enact a statutory notice
of alibi procedure. On the other hand, the court has declined to rule
upon the constitutional validity of the principle of notice of alibi orders.
Prudhomme's language was broad enough and sufficiently equivocal to
support either an affirmative or negative ruling on the abstract question
of whether the privilege against self-incrimination includes the right of
the accused to remain absolutely silent until the prosecution's case has
been presented.
The statutory solution will depend upon the type of disclosure the
accused is required to make. Under Prudhomme, the defendant can-
not, within the confines of the privilege against self-incrimination, be
compelled to "assist the prosecution in proving its case." Yet the
United States Supreme Court in Williams said there is no constitutional
right to surprise the prosecution. Between these two extremes lies a
middle ground of compelled disclosure limited to a mere statement of
intent to assert an alibi. The prosecution is thus provided with notice,
the accused does not become the state's assistant, and the constitutional
balance between the accused and the state remains most nearly unim-
paired.
John J. Allen
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